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Attorneys as Escrow Agents 
Roger Bernhardt 
Introduction 
If you were asked when an attorney, confronted with conflicting demands from his client and 
from the other side, should honor the adversary’s demand at the expense of his own client’s, you 
would naturally answer “never”—but that would be wrong. However, Virtanen v O’Connell 
(2006) 140 CA4th 688, 44 CR3d 702, reported in this issue at p 357, shows that sometimes that 
conclusion can be mistaken. 
Analysis 
If your client is a buyer of property and you are acting not only as his attorney, but also as the 
escrow agent for him and the seller in the sale/purchase transaction, and your client is demanding 
that you close the escrow while the seller is demanding that you not close it, then you probably 
had better obey the seller rather than your own client, and not close that escrow, lest you get into 
the same kind of trouble as O’Connell and his law firm. 
In Virtanen, Virtanen, the seller of stock, deposited it in an escrow maintained by the buyer’s 
attorney with instructions to close when three conditions occurred. Before they all happened, he 
changed his mind and told the escrow agent that he rescinded the deal and demanded return of 
the stock. Rather than complying, the attorney closed the sale and sent the stock certificates off 
to the company’s transfer agent with directions to register them in the buyer’s name. This was 
stopped by the timely filing of a suit by the seller. The buyer ultimately settled, but the case 
against the attorney/escrow holder went to trial, ending with a $2.275 million plaintiff’s verdict 
for conversion. 
It was pretty clear that, as a matter of pure escrow law, O’Connell had done wrong: None of 
the three conditions to which the escrow was subject had occurred when the seller sent his 
rescission notice to the escrow agent. Maybe the sell r was wrong in attempting to back out of 
the deal at that stage, but the one thing that the escrow agent was not entitled to do was to ignore 
that demand and close the escrow anyway. O’Connell argued that he had no duty to return the 
stock to the seller in the face of the conflict, but the court responded that there was a significant 
difference between legitimately refusing to give the stock back to the seller and instead 
wrongfully turning it over to the buyer, as he did. As escrow agent, O’Connell should have just 
frozen when the two sides sent him inconsistent demands. 
All that is pretty unremarkable escrow law, and anyprofessional agent would be expected to 
know that. But O’Connell was also an attorney, and his defense was—if I understand the court’s 
somewhat mangled description of it—that he had a professional obligation to act that way for the 
sake of his client (140 CA4th at 701): 
that any duty he owed to Virtanen conflicted with his undivided duty of loyalty to his own clients 
and that he could not have satisfied both of those c nflicting duties. 
The court’s rejection of that defense held that O’Connell had a “statutorily sanctioned method 
for dealing with conflicting demands, even when one of those demands came from his own 
client,” i.e., an interpleader action. That is technically true, but not a very comforting strategy for 
any attorney to follow when his or her own client is involved. Who wants to tell her own client 
that she won’t do what the client wants because the o r side has not agreed to it? 
There is no doubt that the rule has to be that an attorney acting both as counsel for one party 
and escrow agent must put any fiduciary responsibilities she owes to both parties with regard to 
the escrow above any fiduciary duties she may owe to her own client with regard to the 
underlying deal, or else she will get in the same trouble as did O’Connell. The problem is not 
with the rule, but with allowing a situation to arise where that rule comes into play. O’Connell’s 
mistake, I think, was in voluntarily agreeing to serve as escrow agent while he was already 
counsel to one of the parties to the escrow. 
In this case, the attorney got in trouble with the seller because as escrow agent she did what 
her own buyer/client wanted. But what if she had gone the other way and refused to do what her 
client told her to do because of her overriding escrow responsibilities? She probably would have 
prevailed in any malpractice action the client may h ve later brought against her; but I suspect 
that such a lawsuit would have been brought by her former client, who had since lost all trust and 
confidence in her. It is a terrible thing to do right and lose a client because you did. Is it worth 
the slight extra compensation to expose yourself to such risk? (Further, since the liability is based 
on escrow behavior, would it even be covered by a leg l malpractice insurance policy?) 
Dealing with conflicting instructions is not the only way for an attorney/escrow agent to get in 
trouble. It is hard to reconcile the fiduciary duties of strict neutrality owed by an escrow agent 
with the duties of undivided loyalty owed by an attorney. Furthermore, some courts impose on 
her, as escrow agent, a duty to report fraudulent co duct by one party to the other, which role is 
hardly compatible with her duties as an attorney representing one party in the same situation. 
(She surely has a duty to advise her client not to defraud. Jerome Fishkin, a specialist in attorney 
professional responsibility, advises me that her duty not to assist clients in committing fraud may 
require her to withdraw from the matter entirely. Still, that does not amount to telling the other 
side.) As escrow agent, she may also have duties to xplain to both sides the nature or effect of 
documents they are being asked to sign, which is not what she needs to do as a pure attorney. 
Conclusion 
Some situations are so intrinsically hazardous that attorneys ought to know better than to get 
into them. We do not need to be told to avoid representing both husband and wife in negotiating 
a marital dissolution, or even in negotiating the terms of a sale between a coupled but unmarried 
buyer and seller. All the conflict waivers in the world are unlikely to help in those cases when 
matters go sour. To this list of perils should be added agreeing to be escrow agent, even when the 
deal has been negotiated. 
California not only allows attorneys to serve as escrow agents, it makes it easy to do so by 
waiving the license requirements of the Financial Code (in the worst of all possible cases—when 
the attorney is representing a party to the escrow (Fin C §17006(a)(2)). The best thing we might 
do for ourselves is to get that exemption repealed. 
